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The Italian fiscal history is characterised by a number of fiscal consolidations. In this paper we 
characterise fiscal policy in terms of non-linear deterministic processes. We find that government 
spending and taxes can be described as being non-linear trend stationary processes instead of unit roots. 
A long run equilibrium relationship - a non-linear co-trend - does exist between the two series, fulfilling 
the intertemporal government budget constraint. We interpret this result as evidence of a long run fiscal 
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1.  Introduction 
Italy has contemporary and historically high level of public deficit and debt. 
Economic historians have discussed the circumstances of this high level and the 
policies that from time to time have been implemented to ensure fiscal sustainability. 
Marongiu (1986a, b) introduced the notion of a fiscal rule that the Right established 
during its governments (1861-1876) and that subsequently the Left breached. The 
fiscal rule was to balance the public budget, and the instrument was an increase in 
taxes. Zamagni (1998) concluded her reconstruction of the government debt series 
arguing that a strong increase in debt has been related to exceptional circumstances, 
and that fiscal authorities were always able to implement fast fiscal consolidations. 
Implicitly, she assumed the existence of a fiscal rule, and gave a narrative account for 
its existence.  
In this paper we look for the existence of a long-run fiscal rule, that is a 
deterministic process that several fiscal authorise over time have implemented in order 
to keep the government deficit sustainable. In particular, we consider the issue of the 
inter-temporal government budget constraint that has been extensively analysed in a 
stochastic environment via the unit root and cointegration approach. In our approach, 
for processes that are stationary about non-linear deterministic time trends 
(government spending and taxes), non-linear co-trending is the phenomenon whereby 
one or more linear combinations of the time series are stationary about a linear trend 
and a constant, and hence have common non-linear deterministic time trends (Bierens, 
2000).  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews issues in fiscal 
sustainability and surveys previous empirical results. Section 3 presents the Italian 
fiscal history. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the empirical methodology used here and the 
results, respectively. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
 
2. Fiscal sustainability: theory and empirics 
As individuals, governments face an inter-temporal budget constraint (IGBC). 
Accordingly, they can run a large deficit for a short to medium term, but in the long 
run it is assumed that they cannot play a Ponzi game. If the government issues one-  3
period debt, the real value of the outstanding debt bt, in the discrete-time version, 
evolves according to:  
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where r is the real, constant interest rate, gt is the real government expenditures net of 
interest,  τt is real tax revenues,  t t t t P M M s / ) ( 1 − = +  equals real revenue from 
seigniorage when Mt is the nominal supply of high powered money, and Pt is the price 
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where E(.) denotes the expectation operator conditional to information at time t. From 
the second term of the right-hand side of eq. (2), we impose the transversality 
condition: 
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The government budget constraint is fulfilled, or in other words, fiscal policy is 
sustainable in the long run, if the present value of government spending equals the 
present value of taxes. The analysis of this issue has been carried out using 
cointegration. The rationale is that if revenue and government spending are non-
stationary series, and if they are cointegrated, i.e. there is a linear combination of the 
two series which is stationary (Engle and Granger, 1987), they do not drift apart and 
then the government obeys to its inter-temporal budget constraint. However, this is 
only a necessary but not sufficient condition, since the cointegrating vector should be 
(1, -1) to ensure that taxes match government spending. Another method (Hamilton 
and Flavin, 1986) looks at the stationary properties of the stock of public debt. If the 
debt series is stationary, the debt is sustainable, otherwise the IGBC is not fulfilled. An   4
important issue is whether or not interest payments should be included in the 
constraint. McCallum (1984) argued that a constant, positive deficit (excluding interest 
payments) could not be financed entirely by bond sales; however, a constant positive 
deficit inclusive of interest payments can. Although most studies take this approach, 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) show that the IGBC implies that government expenditure 
inclusive of interest, tax receipts and seigniorage be cointegrated. However, the 
condition is in fact stronger, requiring that the deficit inclusive of interest be stationary. 
Although many studies support the sustainability of government debt, the 
results are controversial. For the periods 1960-1981 and 1890-1986 Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) and Trehan and Walsh (1988), respectively, found that US data was 
consistent with the IGBC. However, the first period is too short to obtain reliable 
results when testing for cointegration.
1  
Bohn (1998) argued that wartime and cyclic fluctuations can obscure the 
relationship between primary surplus and debt. Therefore, univariate regression of the 
first on the second would not detect a significant correlation between the two: even if it 
is impossible to reject a unit root, this test leads to inconsistent and misleading results. 
For 1916-1995 he found that the primary surplus was an increasing function of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, when one controls for wartime and cyclic fluctuations, 
an autoregressive model shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio is mean-reverting. Under 
weak conditions, a positive (at least linear) response of primary surpluses to the debt-
to-GDP ratio implies that the IGBC is satisfied.  
In a number of more recent papers, the stability of the IGBC is tested in face of 
possible changes in fiscal policy. Using US data from 1947(2) to 1992(3), Quintos 
(1995) found a major breakpoint in 1980(4) by applying the Hansen parameter stability 
test. She showed that revenues and expenditure inclusive of interest are cointegrated in 
the pre-break period, but are not cointegrated in the post-break period. The evidence 
supports strong sustainability in the pre-break periods, but only weak sustainability in 
the post-break period.
2 Martin (2000) applied an integrated cointegration/structural 
                                                 
1 Hakkio and Rush (1991) obtained similar results.  
2  Strong sustainability means that the IGBC holds, and the undiscounted debt process Bt, is I(1). Weak 
sustainability means that the constraint holds, but that Bt is exploding at a rate lower than the growth 
rate of the economy. This situation is consistent with sustainability, but may turn into a default situation.    5
methodology, allowing for multiple shifts in level and slope parameters. The 
inferential approach is Bayesian, with rests based on Markow chain Monte Carlo 
posterior simulators. Strong long-run sustainability was found, with three breaks 
endogenously determined in the first quarters of 1975, 1985, and 1987, over the same 
time-span used as in Quintos (1995). However, these changes were small and almost 
offset each other, implying fulfilment of the IGBC over the whole period.
3
 
     
3.  An overview of the Italian fiscal policy 
In this Section we briefly sketch some historical facts about fiscal policy to 
give an idea behind the data of the different arrangements occurred in the period under 
analysis.  
After unification in 1861, fiscal policy was expansionary. The need to fund the 
unification of the new State through infrastructure and the nationalisation of railways, 
the obligation of repaying the debt issued by the Kingdom of Piedmont during the war 
for unification, and a new war of independence with Austria in 1866 put pressure on 
the budget policy. In this situation public debt grew until 80% of the GDP and the first 
fiscal consolidation took place through the increase in taxes.  
During the ruling years of the Left (1876-1896), public budget was used to fund 
investments in railways, iron industry, and military industry. Taxes were not increased 
accordingly and a surge in government deficit occurred.
4 However, this deficit was not 
funded through seigniorage, because Italy returned to the Gold Standard in 1883. This 
decision was not deflationary: it caused a strong inflow of foreign investments, which 
helped industrial development. The Gold Standard was again abandoned during the 
economic crisis in 1887-1895, when both government deficit and debt increased 
because of the active fiscal policy. During the Giolitti period (1901-1913) there was a 
positive interaction between fiscal consolidation and business cycle. Government 
expenditure was almost constant, while taxes grew in real terms; therefore both were 
                                                 
3 Similar results are obtained by Haug (1995), with respect to policy changes during Reagan and Bush 
administrations. 
4 Marongiu (1986b) describe the change in fiscal policy from the Right to the Left as a shift from ‘rules 
to emergency’. A more balanced judgement should consider that during the governments of the Left, the 
World economy suffered from a strong deflation.   6
reduced with respect to GDP, but the former at a faster rate. Together with a reduction 
in international interest rates, and in particular of the spread of the Italian ones with 
respect to those of other major countries, this situation made it possible the second 
fiscal consolidation in 1906, in which bondholders were allowed to choose either to 
exchange their bonds in a perpetuity yielding a 3.75% interest rate or getting repaid at 
the par value. Only 6% of bondholders decided of being refunded and this voluntary 
conversion was successful because the government gained credibility against financial 
markets and savers. 
From 1914 onwards, there are three major episodes of fiscal deficits: before 
and during the two World Wars, and at the end of the period of increasing fiscal 
expansion post-1960. During the World War I military expenditure raised at almost 
50% of the GDP and in 1920 public debt was over 120% of the GDP. During the 
Fascist regime there were two episodes of fiscal consolidation. The minor one took 
place in 1922-1926 through a strong reduction in government expenditure, a high rate 
of inflation that reduced the real value of the government debt, and a remission of debt 
from the US and the UK. This resulted in a return to the gold standard at an overvalued 
exchange rate (the so-called quota 90) that, in the light of rising fiscal deficits and 
military expenditure, could only be defended through the imposition of capital controls 
and trade barriers in later years. In addition, there was a compulsory switching of all 
government bonds with a residual duration of less than seven years into 5% nine-year 
bonds in the second and more important fiscal consolidation of the Fascist 
government. While the first consolidation was obtained by raising taxes, the second 
was achieved through credibility of the government and voluntary switching from 
bond-holders; the third one was made possible by the authoritarianism of the regime.  
The financial needs of Word War II were quite demanding because of the 
isolation of the Italian government. There was an attempt at funding government 
expenditure through forced government bond at a low interest rate, but the government 
debt to GDP ratio skyrocketed again. In 1941 Bank of Italy increased its funding 
leading to an increase in inflation that reduced the above ratio to a quarter. However, 
until 1947 the inflation rate was about 100% per year. Fiscal consolidation was mainly 
achieved through the inflation-tax.   7
In the post-World War II period, Italy joined the Bretton Woods system and, as 
in many other developed economies, monetary policy continued to be dominated by 
the stance of fiscal policy, with the stabilisation of interest rates as the main objective. 
In the 1970s the increase in government expenditure was devoted to the expansion of 
the Welfare State. However, an increase in government debt did not occur because 
while the primary deficit increased, the debt service decreased because the real interest 
rate was lower than the rate of growth of the economy. Interest rates were 
exceptionally low because of restrictions that prevented the diversification abroad of 
the financial wealth. When these constraints were removed the interest rates increased 
together with the government debt. The pattern follows that of the high-inflation 
OECD countries from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, with rising deficits leading to 
higher inflation.  
The fiscal dominance of monetary policy was only broken in the early 1980s, 
when the Bank of Italy gradually acquired greater independence in setting monetary 
policy, and did so independently of fiscal considerations. In addition, in 1978 the entry 
in the European Exchange Rate System imposed an additional constraint on monetary 
policy, namely on inflation. In 1979 the so-called divorce between the Treasury and 
the Bank of Italy took the form of the removal of the obligation on the part of the Bank 
to buy unsold Treasury Bills at auctions. In the 1990s the objective of both fiscal and 
monetary policies has been to achieve inflation convergence with the Euro-area and 
exchange rate stability to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. A reduction of the debt over 
GDP ratio was achieved through a reduction in government expenditure, in particular 
public employees and pension schemes, and an increase in taxes to obtain a substantial 
primary surplus.  
 
4. Empirical methodology and data 
The first stage of this work is to establish whether the series are non-linear trend 
stationary. This is done in two ways: first we apply a battery of tests in which the unit 
root hypothesis is either the null or the alternative, tested against stationarity or trend 
stationarity, as appropriate. Conflicting results of these tests may be interpreted as the 
possibility of the series being stationary around a non-linear deterministic trend. Next 
we apply four tests developed by Bierens (1997) in which the null of a unit root with   8
drift process is tested against non-linear trend stationarity. After the data generating 
process has been assessed and specified in terms of non-linear trend stationarity, we 
implement the Bierens (2000) co-trending test.  
Cushman (2002) systematises the tests proposed by Bierens (1997), based on 
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where P0, t to Pm, t are Chebishev polynomials, P0, t equals 1, P1, t is equivalent to a 
linear trend, and P2, t through Pm, t are cosine functions. We use four tests from this 
model: 
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3.  ), ( ˆ m F  joint F test on α ˆ  and the coefficients of non-constant Chebishev 
polynomials; 
4.  ), (
~
m T  non-parametric joint test on α ˆ  and the coefficients of non-linear Chebishev 
polynomials. 
The null of these tests is unit root with drift, while the alternative is linear or 
non-linear deterministic trend stationarity. In particular, right-side rejections for the 
), ( ˆ m t   A ˆ , and  ) (
~
m T  tests indicate non-linear trend stationarity, whereas left-side 
rejections are ambiguous, since the process can be mean stationary, trend stationary or 
non-linear trend stationary. The  ) ( ˆ m F test is one sided and right-side rejections lead to 
non-linear trend stationary.  
Once we have determined that the series are stationary around a non-linear trend, 
we can investigate whether they have non-linear trends in common. Bierens (2000) 
develops a test similar to the search for common stochastic trends and cointegration for 
                                                 
5 Bierens (1997) specifies this test without taking the absolute value. This modification is made in 
Bierens (2005) because, under H1,φˆ can be negative.   9
unit root series, a relationship called non-linear co-trending.
6 As put by Cushman 
(2002), the test is based on the eigenvalues of matrices constructed from partial sum of 
the variables. It is nonparametric since the non-linear trends and serial correlation 
processes do not need to be specified. The test statistic is λr for r = 1 through k, where 
r is the number of co-trending vectors under the null, and k is the number of variables. 
The alternative hypothesis is that there are r – 1 co-trending vectors. The test 
procedure also gives estimates for the co-trending vector parameters. Let yt denote a 






T n t F n t F n M
1






t y n x F
1
) / 1 ( ) ( ˆ if ] 1 , [
1 − ∈ n x , 0 ) ( ˆ = x F if ] , 0 [


































2    `    (6) 
Then solve: 
0 ˆ ˆ
2 1 = − M M λ .            ( 7 )  
Taking the ordered solutions of (7), the test statistics are calculated as  r n λ
α ˆ 1− . s, the 
order of nonparametric serial correlation correction is equal to n
α, with α = 0.05 which 
is the rate of convergence of the partial sum that embodies the serial correlation 
correction. 
 This analysis is applied to Italian annual data from 1861 to 1998. Expenditure 
(LGOV) is defined as the log of sum of total budget outlays less interest payments on 
debt, calculated as a ratio to GDP. The average tax rate (LTAX) is the log of the ratio of 
government revenue to GDP. Data for GDP, debt, interest payment on outstanding 
debt are from Fratianni and Spinelli (2001). Government expenditure and taxes are 
from Spinelli and Fratianni (1991) for the period 1861-1980, and from Istat (various 
                                                 
6 Related work on co-breaking is developed by Clements and Hendry (1999, ch. 9). They define co-
breaking as the removal of deterministic shifts using linear combinations of variables. It is introduced, 
for example, to analyse cointegration between series with different order of integration. Also relevant is 
recent work on non-linear cointegration, as surveyed by Dufrenot and Mignon (2002).    10
years) for the remaining period. All the original data is in nominal terms. Figure 1 
shows non-logarithmic data for these variables and government debt. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
5.   Empirical results  
In this Section we present the results of our estimations. We then apply a battery of 
non-linear trend stationarity tests. Having shown that the series are non-linear trend 
stationary, we then test for the existence of common long-run behaviour between 
government expenditure and taxes. All the estimations have been carried out using 
Bierens software EasyReg International. 
 
5.1 Non-linear trend stationarity tests 
When implementing the Bierens non-linear trend stationarity test, one faces the 
decision to determine p, the order of lagged first difference of the stochastic part of the 
time series, and m, the order of the Chebishev time polynomials. One can use different 
criteria in determining p, for example the AIC or the sequential test proposed by Ng 
and Perron (1995). We opted for the former method, which is more appropriate for 
simulating the actual value of the test size, though the other results in lower size 
distortion. The issue of choosing m is more difficult, since there is no explicit criterion 
to determine it. If m  is too low, a non-linear trend may not be detected, which 
determines a lack of power. If m is too large, superfluous parameters are estimated, 
which may cause lack of power. We perform the four tests outlined above for all the 
values of m from 2 to 20. Nonetheless, the tests show substantial size distortion, their 
assessment has to be done by simulating p-values by estimating an autoregressive first 
difference model (with lag order determined by AIC). Using the estimated parameters 
and sampling from the rescaled residuals of the estimated model, 1,000 new first 
difference series were generated, using the first p + 1 actual values to initialise. Errors 
were drawn from the normal distribution with zero mean and variances the squared 
OLS residuals.  
For government spending (Table 1) we find an area of right-sided rejections of 
the null of unit root in the range of m included between 8 and 11, with all the tests   11
leading to rejection for m = 9 and 10. For the LTAX variable (Table 2) we find about 
the same range for m. These results overall suggest non-linear trend stationarity for 
both variables, and our conclusion is to set m = 9 to both series as possible common 
non-linear trend. 
 
[Table 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the fit of the model for government expenditure and 
taxes, respectively.
7 The autoregressive part of the model (p) was set equal to 1 for 
LTAX and 2 for LGOV, according to the AIC.  
 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
 
5.2 Co-trending test 
Now we turn to the non-linear co-trending test. The parameter α was set equal to 0.5, 
and the test was conducted on the de-trended variables, since Figures 2 and 3 show an 
upward trend of the two variables. The corresponding generalized eigenvectors of  1 ˆ M  
with respect to  2 ˆ M are: 
 
1         -0.232 ← LGOV          (12) 
          -0.284           1 ← LTAX 
 
When the hypothesis of r co-trending vectors was tested against the alternative of r - 1 
co-trending vectors, yielded the results summarized in Table 3, which tells us that there 
exists one co-trending vector. This standardised vector H = (1, 0.336) is determined 
according to a λ-max test statistic equal to 0.05 with 10% and 5% critical values 
respectively equal to 0.120 and 0.150, under the null that there exists a co-trending 
vector x satisfying x = Hy, where y is an arbitrary conformable vector. 
                                                 
7 Note that in these figures the values of the variables are standardised, whereas in Figure 1 they are the 
actual values.   12
We can write F(x) = Q2Q2'F(x), where Q2 is the matrix of orthogonal 
eigenvectors of  1 ˆ M  corresponding to the positive eigenvalues. The vector Q2'F(x) can 
be interpreted as the vector of common cumulative non-linear trends. Similarly, F'(x) = 
Q2Q2'F'(x), where Q2 is the matrix of orthogonal eigenvectors of  2 ˆ M corresponding to 
the positive eigenvalues. The vector Q2'F'(x) can be interpreted as the vector of 
common non-linear trends. Figure 4 and 5 plots the estimated F(x) and F’(x) 
components for both LGOV and LTAX, standardised between –1 and 1. They appear 
rather synchronised, confirming that government receipts and outlays are linked via a 
common non-linear trend.  
[Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
 
Finally, these estimates allow us to write: 
Common nonlinear trend  =  
     0.8547 x Component of F'(x) corresponding to LGOV 
     0.5189 x Component of F'(x) corresponding to LTAX      (13) 
 
Nonlinear trend in LGOV = 0.8547 x Common nonlinear trend     (14) 
 
Nonlinear trend in LTAX =  0.5189 x Common nonlinear trend     (15) 
   
Figure 6 plots the co-trending relationships between the variables. 
 
[Figures 6 about here] 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the issue of the intertemporal government budget 
constraint applying the notions of non-linear trend stationarity and non-linear co-
trending or the two time series involved in this framework: government outlays and 
receipts. We found that the two series can be represented by non-linear trend 
stationarity instead of unit root processes, and that a non-linear long-run relationship 
does exist between them, fulfilling fiscal sustainability. From an economic point of 
view, it makes sense to think that policy makers (those responsible for fiscal decisions 
over the long period analysed here) might have acted as if they were guided by specific 
rules (e.g., do not accumulate too much government debt) in responding to stochastic   13
fiscal shocks. As long as these shocks are stochastic, we can figure out that responses 
were stochastic signals too. From time to time there were presumably different 
attitudes to respond to fiscal signals, because fiscal authorities do change over time. 
Therefore, the non-linear trend relationships uncovered here constitute a mixture of 
stochastic and deterministic components in the making of fiscal policy.  
  This interpretation makes sense from an historical point of view: as discussed 
in section 3, Italy experienced five major episodes of fiscal consolidation that followed 
periods of raising government expenditure. The first one in the 90s of the nineteen 
century was obtained by raising taxes, the second in 1906 with a voluntary bond swap 
that was successful because the government gained credibility against financial 
markets and savers for its efforts in promoting a sound financial stance. The third event 
was obtained by the Fascist government in the 30s when there was a compulsory 
switching of all government bonds with a residual duration of less than seven years 
into 5% nine-year bonds, together with other protectionist measures. The fourth 
episode occurred after the World War II and was achieved through skyrocketing 
inflation that dramatically cut the value of government debt. The latest fiscal 
consolidation was accomplished again rising taxes and took place in the ‘90s when 
Italy joined the Euro. This brief sketch shows how the policy responses were different 
to different fiscal shocks, still keeping the Italian economy on a fiscally sustainable 
path. The econometric evidence we report is therefore consistent with of Zamagni 
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Dotted line: non-linear model (p = 2, m = 9) 
Solid line: LGOV 
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Dotted line: non-linear model (p = 1, m = 9) 
Solid line: LTAX      
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Solid line: LTAX 
Dotted line: 0.7161 x LGOV 
Solid line: component F’(x) corresponding to LGOV 
Dotted line: 0.85477 x common trend 
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Table 1 – Small sample pretests of the tests of the unit root hypothesis against non-
linear trend stationarity for LGOV (p = 2) 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
m tˆ   0.162 0.308 0.300 0.392 0.512 0.704 0.371 
A ˆ   0.135 0.296 0.359 0.368 0.445 0.678 0.061 
m F ˆ   0.805 0.453 0.528 0.304 0.118 0.043 0.010 
T
~
    0.150 0.220 0.077 0.084 0.044 0.077 
  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 
m tˆ   0.973 0.985 0.918 0.527 0.629 0.710 0.713 
A ˆ   0.981 0.992 0.980 0.425 0.578 0.763 0.681 
m F ˆ   0.975 0.995 0.992 0.097 0.224 0.254 0.257 
T
~
  0.968 0.986 0.950 0.086 0.427 0.534 0.527 
  16 17 18 19 20    
m tˆ   0.645 0.814 0.827 0.875 0.928    
A ˆ   0.757 0.796 0.826 0.887 0.931    
m F ˆ   0.285 0.171 0.112 0.068 0.420    
T
~
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Table 2 – Small sample pretests of the tests of the unit root hypothesis against non-
linear trend stationarity for LTAX (p = 1) 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
m tˆ   0.930 0.720 0.826 0.756 0.610 0.736 0.973 
A ˆ   0.929 0.723 0.854 0.709 0.573 0.762 0.994 
m F ˆ   0.024 0.330 0.406 0.467 0.467 0.393 0.978 
T
~
    0.885 0.869 0.757 0.730 0.754 0.926 
  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 
m tˆ   0.974 0.991 0.733 0.492 0.726 0.740 0.836 
A ˆ   0.972 0.941 0.884 0.717 0.755 0.792 0.898 
m F ˆ   0.987 0.986 0.385 0.602 0.423 0.456 0.257 
T
~
  0.979 0.987 0.088 0.389 0.854 0.816 0.685 
  16 17 18 19 20    
m tˆ   0.687 0.832 0.621 0.531 0.820    
A ˆ   0.871 0.835 0.804 0.614 0.763    
m F ˆ   0.370 0.295 0.601 0.615 0.489    
T
~
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Table 3 – Test of the number r of co-trending vectors 
r  Test statistics  10% critical region 5%  critical  region Conclusion 
1 0.0537 >0.119  >0.151  Accept 
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